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Abstract  
 
This paper develops a motivation-based perspective to explore how organisations resolve 
the social dilemma of knowledge sharing, and the ways in which different motivational 
mechanisms interact to foster knowledge sharing and creation in different organisational 
contexts. The core assumption is that the willingness of organisational members to 
engage in knowledge sharing can be viewed on a continuum from purely opportunistic 
behaviour regulated by extrinsic incentives to an apparently altruistic stance fostered by 
social norms and group identity. The analysis builds on a three-category taxonomy of 
motivation: adding ‘hedonic’ motivation to the traditional dichotomy of extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation.  Based on an analysis of empirical case studies in the literature, we 
argue that the interaction and mix of the three different motivators play a key role in 
regulating and translating potential into actual behaviour, and they underline the 
complex dynamics of knowledge sharing and creation in different organisational 
contexts. 
 
Keywords 
 
Knowledge sharing; tacit knowledge; motivation; incentives; organizational learning; 
human resource practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 KNOWLEDGE CREATION AND SHARING IN ORGANISATIONAL 
CONTEXTS: A MOTIVATION-BASED PERSPECTIVE 
 
ALICE LAM* AND JEAN-PAUL LAMBERMONT-FORD 
School of Management, Royal Holloway, University of London 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Knowledge sharing is a key process in translating individual learning into organizational 
capability (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). But 
facilitating knowledge sharing is a difficult task: the willingness of individual to share 
and integrate their knowledge is one of the central barriers. Despite the voluminous 
literature on organisational learning and knowledge management, the nature of the 
relationship between individual motivation and knowledge sharing in organisations 
remains largely unexplored and poorly understood (Osterloh et al, 2002). 
 
Existing theories of the firm have tended to place emphasis on the centrality of one 
particular motivational mechanism in governing the behaviours of firm members 
(Gottschalg and Zollo, 2006). Each of the theories on its own offers at best a partial 
explanation of why individuals do or don’t share knowledge. The knowledge-based 
view, which has gained wide popularity in recent years, focuses on the social and 
collective dimension of organisational learning, viewing organisations as knowing 
entities and communities of practice that foster identity, commitment and learning 
(Brown and Duguid, 1998; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Spender, 1996; Tsoukas, 1996). 
It implicitly assumes a utopian view of ‘benevolent co-operators’ who voluntarily give 
up personal knowledge without appropriate reward. While it draws our attention to the 
importance of identity-based normative intrinsic motivation, it neglects potential 
conflicts of interest and incentive issues (Foss, 2003; Langlois and Foss, 1999). This 
‘positive’ view stands in stark contrast with the ‘negative’ transaction cost view that 
assumes the worst self-interested opportunistic behaviour among firm members who 
seek to hoard knowledge unless sanctioned or induced to deviate from such behaviour 
(Williamson, 1987, 1996). The transaction cost perspective recognises that transforming 
conflict among self-interested actors into cooperation is a non-trivial problem. It 
recognises the problem of social dilemmas of knowledge sharing in organisations 
(Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002; Morris T, 2001) and assumes that these dilemmas can be 
resolved through monitoring and incentive alignment (Teece, 2003). The basic premise 
is that incentive-driven extrinsic motivation dominates other kinds of motivation. 
 
In this paper, we argue that theories of organisational learning and knowledge creation 
will benefit from the insights of both these two perspectives, taking their differing 
behavioural assumptions and emphasis on the centrality of particular motivational 
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 mechanisms as a starting point. We seek to develop a motivation-based perspective to 
explore the problematic relationship between individual employees’ knowledge and the 
totality of the organisation. The paper builds on the large literature on employee 
motivation (Amabile, 1993; Deci, 1976; Deci and Ryan, 1985, 1987; Frey, 1992; Locke 
and Latham, 2004), and recent research on the management of motivation as distinctive 
firm competences (Gottschalg and Zollo, 2006; Osterloh, 2005; Osterloh and Frey, 
2000). The aim is to understand how organisations resolve the social dilemmas of 
knowledge sharing, and the ways in which different motivational mechanisms interact to 
foster the transfer and creation of tacit and explicit knowledge. 
 
By focussing on the motivational processes and the relationship between different types 
of motivators, we seek to bridge the traditional dichotomous view of treating knowledge 
sharing as either dominated by opportunistic or altruistic behaviour. We assume that both 
kinds of behaviour are plausible and potentially exist, and the willingness of 
organisational members to engage in knowledge sharing can be viewed on a continuum 
from purely opportunistic behaviour regulated by management authority to an apparently 
altruistic stance fostered by social norms and group identity (Christensen, 2005). We 
argue that motivational mechanisms play a key role in regulating and translating 
potential behaviour into actual behaviour, and they underline the complex dynamics of 
knowledge sharing and creation within different organisational contexts. 
 
The analysis presented in the paper will draw on existing empirical studies to examine 
the relationship between motivation and knowledge sharing, and explore the different 
approaches used to resolve the social dilemma of knowledge sharing within different 
organisational contexts. In looking at social dilemmas and the ways in which 
organisations address them, we examine the relationship between HRM practices in use 
and the motivational disposition of employees to knowledge sharing. We believe that 
adopting a motivation-based perspective will add new insights into our understanding of 
the nature of the firm as a knowledge creating organisation. It could offer proposals for 
action in terms of organisational design and management practices that can better meet 
practitioner expectations than those derived from the narrow transaction-cost or 
knowledge-based perspectives. 
 
MOTIVATION AND KNOWLEDGE SHARING  
 
A Taxonomy of Motivation and Motivational Mechanisms 
 
In examining motivation, Deci’s (1976) original separation of motivation into extrinsic 
and intrinsic is taken as a basis. Extrinsic motivation allows individuals to satisfy their 
needs indirectly by obtaining additional resources (e.g. money, promotion and other non-
financial resources). Markets systematically use extrinsic incentives (profits and rents) 
for motivational purposes. In an organisational context, extrinsic motivators may vary 
from piece-rate pay (Lazear, 1988) through pay for performance (Prendergast, 1999), 
partnership (Morris T and Pinnington, 1998) to career progression (Morris T and 
Empson, 1998). Extrinsic motivation supports the transfer of explicit knowledge but 
often fails in the case of tacit knowledge. This is because of the indeterminate nature of 
tacit knowledge and the difficulty of monitoring those who do not process tacit 
knowledge. The exclusive use of extrinsic motivation often places the individual in a 
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 transactional rather than a relational stance in respect of the organisation, which may be 
suitable in certain organisational situations, such as the use of consultants or where there 
is a need to codify tacit knowledge to a limited extent (Hall and Sapsed, 2005: 73). 
 
Intrinsic motivation gives immediate need satisfaction: an activity ‘is valued for its own 
sake and appears to be self sustaining’ (Deci, 1976: 105). Intrinsic motivation facilitates 
the generation and transfer of tacit knowledge under conditions in which extrinsic 
motivation fails (Osterloh and Frey, 2000). Within our analysis, we use Lindenberg’s 
(2001) division of intrinsic motivation into normative and hedonic types which interact 
with each other and with extrinsic motivation, providing a more complete match between 
the individual and organisational environments. 
 
Normative intrinsic motivation is directed towards the individual’s sense of compliance 
with personal and social norms, expressed at an organisational level through the 
organisation’s espoused values, and for the individual in terms of their identification 
with the social groups that they identify with (Kreps, 1997). The degree to which an 
individual acts or does not act when normatively motivated depends on the importance 
that they attach to compliance in a given context and also the external reaction to non-
compliance. Lindenberg (2001) suggests that the achievement of a strong sense of 
community and solidarity through shared normative values is achieved by inhibiting 
action for personal gain, which may lead to intellectual sterility and a lessening of 
potentially innovative opportunity. 
 
Hedonic intrinsic motivation is derived from engagement in self-determined, 
competence enhancing and enjoyable activity, achieved through physical and social 
wellbeing and improvement in the individual’s condition (Lindenberg, 2001). In terms of 
knowledge sharing, this influences the willingness of an individual to share knowledge, 
depending on the importance that the individual attributes to being engaged in such 
activity in the context of the task and perceived task characteristics. Hedonic motivation 
has been shown to be an important factor stimulating creativity and innovation in that 
strong hedonic motivation induces knowledge seeking behaviour and increases cognitive 
effort (Amabile, 1997). This implies that a different focus may be necessary in looking at 
the tension between sharing knowledge in the contexts of knowledge exploitation and 
augmentation, with the latter possibly building on a higher hedonic element than the 
former. 
 
Interaction Effects Among Different Motivators 
 
The above three types of motivation are not necessarily additive and there may be 
complex interaction effects between them. The relationship between extrinsic incentives 
and intrinsic motivation is analysed in terms of ‘crowding’ effects by economists 
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). 
Social psychologists use the term ‘motivational synergy’ to conceptualise this interactive 
effect (Amabile, 1997; Hennessey and Amabile, 1998). 
 
Extrinsic rewards may undermine intrinsic motivation for interesting tasks and 
encourage knowledge hoarding. Recent research has confirmed the existence of this 
‘crowding-out’ (Frey and Jegen, 2001) or ‘non-synergistic’ effect (Amabile, 1997). 
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 Within these, several key factors have been put forward to explain the possibility of 
‘crowing-out’ effect, relating to the possibility of agents seeing their self-determination 
or self-esteem affected by incentives, (Amabile, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001), or a 
change in the level of involvement and enjoyment (Amabile, 1997; Seo et al, 2004) 
which may affect the overall level of motivation for a given goal. Self-determination 
may be reduced if the actual or perceived locus of control shifts outside the individual, 
lessening autonomy and reducing the scope of the individual to act in an altruistic 
manner (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). Thus extrinsic motivators in terms of goal and 
task constraint or organisational structure may circumscribe the individual’s autonomy 
and lessen intrinsic motivation. Self-esteem may be lessened when the individual’s 
intrinsic motivation is not acknowledged, implying that their competence or effort are 
not appreciated. This may occur when incentives are given for specific performances or 
behaviours, quantifying effort and competence, thus changing the stance in regard to the 
task from an internally driven, relational one to a reward driven, transactional one. This 
indicates that incentives that quantify effort are rewarded by the effort that the individual 
deems necessary to obtain the reward. In an organisational setting, this can be seen 
where employees are rewarded for contributing to knowledge-bases and make only 
sufficient contribution to gain the payoff, or when sharing knowledge enables others to 
gain reward in place of the individual, overcoming normative or hedonic motivation to 
share knowledge (Kreps, 1997). 
 
Conversely, the beneficial effect of extrinsic motivators on hedonic and normative 
motivation is termed “crowding-in” by Frey and Jegen (2001) and “synergistic” by 
Amabile (1997). These operate by being perceived as supportive by the individual and 
congruent with their underlying normative and hedonic motivational preferences. 
Extrinsic motivators that provide feedback, recognition and reward and which confirm or 
improve competences lead to increased self-esteem. Similarly extrinsic motivators such 
as career progression or increased involvement that aligns with the individual’s 
normative and hedonic motivators can have a synergistic effect. Furthermore, high 
personal commitment (normative) and enjoyment (hedonic) of the task at hand can be 
unaffected by extrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1997); in these instances, the activity itself 
provides sufficient motivation.  
 
The combined effects of ‘crowding-out’ and ‘crowding-in’ on motivation is not 
reducible to a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ situation, but may be analysed as a continuum 
between the two regulated by specific combination or bundle of incentives and 
motivational mechanisms within different organisational contexts. Normative and 
hedonic motivation are seen to be essential in knowledge sharing and creative activities 
(Amabile, 1997; Huber, 2001), and the options for an organisation in terms of motivation 
are limited by its structure and nature of tasks performed. Whilst this has been examined 
at an organisational / individual level, there are different motivators at different levels, 
which may combine or conflict. Within the three types, normative motivation is seen as 
the most likely to be displaced by one of the other two types, and can only remain stable 
if both hedonic and extrinsic motivators are relatively weak and congruent (Lindenberg, 
2001). This suggests that whilst the organisation can influence the extrinsic motivation 
within its purview, and indirectly influence normative motivation, it can only have 
limited influence [eg job design but see later] on a key element: hedonic motivation. 
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 Where then, does motivation play a part in knowledge sharing? How do organisations 
leverage the different motivational mechanisms through HRM practices to foster 
knowledge sharing? What organisational forms are most conducive to the generation and 
transfer of tacit knowledge, and how do the different motivational mechanisms interact 
to shape learning and knowledge creation? 
 
 
OVERCOMING THE ‘SOCAL DILEMMA’ OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
WITHIN ORGANISATIONS: HRM PRACTICES AND MOTVATION 
 
Social Dilemmas of Knowledge Sharing: Why People Share or Hoard Knowledge? 
 
Why do individuals share knowledge - an intangible private asset - in the context of an 
organisation, when their effort is neither directly measurable nor sanctionable? We look 
at this through the lens of Cabrera and Cabrera’s (2002) work on knowledge sharing and 
social dilemmas. Shared knowledge becomes a public good from which interdependent 
members of an organisation can benefit directly whether or not they have contributed. 
This may lead to opportunistic behaviour and free-riding as there is a possibility to 
benefit without contributing – from an economic perspective, the individual gains 
without the cost. The cost to individuals may not only be in the effort and time spent in 
sharing knowledge but also, depending on the organisational context, by sharing 
knowledge they may diminish their own opportunities for advancement or enhance the 
advancement opportunities of others, thus losing in internal competition. A further 
attribute of the public good dilemma is that when non-contribution is not sanctioned and 
few individuals are perceived to contribute, the motivation to contribute diminishes and 
the value of contributing to the public good becomes questionable. This effect operates 
at different levels. First, the normative motivation to share knowledge is lessened as not 
sharing is seen to become an acceptable practice. Second, the extrinsic motivation to 
share, expressed via the (dis)incentive of sanctions, is not present thus reinforcing the 
change in normative motivation. Cabrera and Cabrera (2002: 693) suggest that most 
individuals are willing to bear the cost of contributing to a public good, and receiving its 
benefits as long as there “were an assurance that everybody else was going to pay his or 
her share”. This suggests that reinforcing normative motivators to share knowledge, 
providing suitable incentives for doing so and changing the perceived locus of ownership 
of knowledge as a public rather than private good may augment knowledge sharing 
propensity amongst individuals in an organisation. Implementing these changes at an 
organisational level involves changes in appraisal and reward systems, as well as 
inculcating values aligned with acceptable and encouraged practices and providing a 
setting wherein knowledge sharing can occur. 
 
The social dilemma of knowledge sharing can be overcome in part by restructuring the 
payoff function (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002: 695). From the inter-related effects of 
motivation, pure extrinsic motivation in financial terms will be of little use unless very 
high (Gneezy, 2003). However, relocating the focus of payoff from the individual to 
organisation and / or team should encourage cooperative action, as peer pressure will 
come into play: contributing enhances potential gain; not contributing decreases both 
personal potential gain and that of others. This does not preclude individual incentives 
recognising and rewarding knowledge sharing, but these may be more effective if they 
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 enhance self-determination (autonomy though career progression) and self-esteem 
(competence enhancement through training) and should be congruent with the 
individual’s motivational preferences, not only within but outside the organisation. 
 
Normative motivation may be influenced by the organisation, reinforcing the 
individual’s current motivational stance towards knowledge sharing. This is dependent 
not only on promoting an ethos of knowledge sharing through organisational values, but 
also acknowledging the contribution of the individual’s normative attitude towards 
sharing, which may draw on their professional background (Lam, 2000) and embedded 
culture (Lam, 1997) which in turn raises possible issues of the legitimacy of norms 
between different epistemic and embedded cultures. Drawing on the large corpus of 
knowledge sharing literature, socialisation, common understanding and trust building 
play a significant part in sharing, which can also be related to normative congruence 
between individuals and between individuals and the organisation. We suggest that such 
practices should play a major role in the likelihood of sharing behaviour. But what 
means does an organisation have for enhancing hedonic motivation, a quintessentially 
personal aspect that cannot be dictated externally? This can potentially be answered by 
creating an environment which allows individuals to satisfy their motivational 
preferences and concords with their needs for self-determination and self-esteem. We 
suggest that this can be achieved through careful work design which acts at a hedonic 
level but which is also integrated with normative and extrinsic motivators available to 
the organisation. 
 
This may seem utopian, leading to the “crowding-out” of productive work as individuals 
engage only in enjoyable work. The challenge for organisations therefore is to balance 
the application of HRM practices to achieve a suitable mix for individuals. However, 
heterogeneity in incentives and practices may be perceived as unfair and difficult to 
manage, whilst homogeneity may lessen knowledge sharing but is perceived as fairer 
and easier to manage.  
 
Knowledge Sharing and Motivation in Different Organisational Contexts 
 
The range of motivators at the disposal of an organisation and its underlying 
motivational basis differ between different types of organisations. Clearly, the available 
motivators, those used and those that are effective in a windscreen-repair firm (Lazear, 
1988) are different to those used in a professional services firm (Morris T and Empson, 
1998), and thus the concomitant social dilemmas and potential crowding effects vary 
between organisational types.  
 
In our analysis, we use ideal-type firm structures derived from Mintzberg (1980) 
focussing on two types that relate to knowledge intensive firms: the professional 
bureaucracy and operating adhocracy. Each form has different coordinating mechanisms 
focussing on the division of labour into distinct tasks and their subsequent coordination. 
The forms also have distinctive features in respect of their institutional background and 
the types of knowledge underpinning them.  They also differ in their ability to foster the 
sharing of tacit knowledge and hence their learning and innovative capability (Lam, 
2000), implying different approaches to motivation within the two knowledge intensive 
types. 
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In contrast to the machine bureaucracy, both types rely on prior high levels of expertise 
and training, resulting in skills and knowledge that are personally held but need to be 
shared to meet the organisation’s goals. Within both types there is low formalisation of 
behaviour and relatively high autonomy and grouping is both functional and market 
oriented, with decentralised control. The social dilemma common to both relates to the 
degree and extent to which individuals are willing to contribute and use their personal, 
tacit knowledge to the “public good” of the organisation. The relatively loose structuring 
and high complexity of the two types coupled with high levels of training and normative 
alignment contrasts with the machine bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1980: 330), giving 
greater scope for the use of normative and hedonic motivation which we contend are 
necessary components to overcome social dilemmas. These two knowledge-intensive 
types, however, differ between their main coordination mechanisms, patterns of work 
organisation and the degree of standardisation of knowledge in use (Lam, 2000). A 
comparative analysis of these two types will give important insights into the interactive 
effects of the three different motivators and how these are melded through work norms 
and HRM practices. 
 
A professional bureaucracy derives its capability from the formal ‘embrained 
knowledge’ (Blackler, 1995) of highly trained individual experts operating in an 
autonomous work environment with coordination achieved by standardisation of skills 
and knowledge. Task performance can be monitored and regulated by external 
professional bodies and standards, and extrinsic rewards such as financial gain, 
professional recognition and career progression. Such experts can be highly mobile in 
the external labour market and retention can be an issue (Hall and Sapsed, 2005; 
Robertson et al, 2003). Concordance of values runs along professional lines through 
embedded professional norms and inculcated organisational ones. The form of working 
within the professional bureaucracy may be within a single professional grouping or 
functionally segmented, leading to tensions between epistemic legitimacy, contexts and 
goals, potentially limiting sharing across functional groups (Ferlie et al, 2005; Kinti et al, 
2005). This adds to the complexity of potential social dilemmas and differing effects of 
motivational perspectives and crowding, as knowledge is held in the individual and 
affirms their status (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002). The operating environment is both 
complex and stable – complexity through the demands of knowledge and skills inherent 
through extensive training – both initial and continuing – and stable to ensure that the 
skills become part of the standard operating practices. As administrative control tends to 
rest within the professional groups and due to the autonomy and heterogeneity of 
professional groupings, there may be different motivators used within the organisation 
(Morris T and Empson, 1998). The reinforcement of professional inter-group boundaries 
with administrative ones is further likely to generate a strong sense of professional rather 
than organisational identity, and thus alignment with professional rather than 
organisational norms. Whilst the high degree of task autonomy associated with 
normative and hedonic motivation enables the generation of tacit knowledge in problem 
solving, the high level of individual specialisation and functional segmentation means 
that the tacit knowledge is circumscribed and contained. Underpinning knowledge is 
codified, with an expectation that the results of knowledge exploitation will similarly be 
made explicit, for example in the generation of intervention reports and best practices. 
This further implies that an individual’s tacit knowledge will be made public within the 
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 organisation, leading to issues of degree and quality of disclosure. The social dilemma 
within the professional bureaucracy hinges on whether the individual hoards their 
knowledge for pursuance of their career, whether to share it within their professional 
community or to share it within the organisation. The challenge for the organisation is to 
make use of the high inherent normative professional motivation and to reinforce it with 
other types of motivators. 
 
The operating adhocracy epitomises the project-based organization, drawing its 
capability from the diverse know-how and practical problem-solving skills embodied in 
individual experts operating in market-based project teams. Compared with the 
professional bureaucracy, there is a lower degree of formalisation of work and 
knowledge. Unlike the independent experts in a professional bureaucracy, the specialists 
from different professions in an adhocracy must work together on multidisciplinary 
teams and combine their knowledge to produce creative solutions for their clients. There 
is a high identity with the organisation and professional specialism and high levels of 
autonomy in terms of working practices and team membership. There is little 
hierarchical structure, with quasi-formal authority given to staff, extending to an extent 
through to strategy making, emergent from the ad-hoc decisions made for all projects. 
This implies high levels of participation within the organisation, and lessens 
differentiation between the planning, design and execution of projects. Knowledge 
sharing within the adhocracy is person-to-person, although it may rely on codified rules, 
and shared work practices and routines derived from previous and ongoing projects. 
 
Coordination within an operating adhocracy is achieved through mutual adjustment, 
necessitating the alignment of the interests and skills of team members towards the 
project’s goal and firm’s overall objectives through both professional and consensual 
norms. This means that high normative motivation and congruence are required to 
develop team spirit and foster the integration of individual tacit knowledge within the 
team. Furthermore, because of the fluid nature of the organisation and thus high need for 
reactivity, barriers to socialisation, contextualisation, common knowledge and expertise 
levels should be low to facilitate person-to-person knowledge sharing. In this kind of 
organisation, high powered extrinsic rewards such as performance-related pay and 'up-
or-out' promotion rules may be used to align incentives of the individual experts with the 
interest of the organisation (Morris T and Pinnington, 1998; Teece, 2003). However, the 
underlying strong, congruent normative motivation that integrates the team may inhibit 
hedonic motivation in terms of creativity (Amabile, 1997). Management face the 
difficult task of having to maintain a delicate balance between extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivational mechanisms. Another major dilemma is that strong normative motivation 
that serves to integrate individual with the team may inhibit hedonic intrinsic motivation 
(Hennessey and Amabile, 1998; Seo et al, 2004). The operating adhocracy is an 
organisation riddled with ambiguities and dilemmas (Mintzberg, 1980; Robertson et al, 
2003). It is the most innovative yet least stable organisational form. 
 
 
SOME EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES 
 
The case studies have been chosen from literature that relates to project and team 
working. These contexts are seen as becoming an integral way of working in many firms 
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 (Prencipe and Tell, 2001) as they allow disparate resources, including but not limited to 
knowledge to be brought together for a specific goal. They can, therefore, encompass not 
only a wide range in terms of function, but also in terms of distribution within and across 
organizations, leading to issues of knowledge coordination and integration not only 
during the task itself, but in its implementation and potential re-use, as well as 
discrepancies in goal relevance and resource attribution (Morris P, 1997). 
 
The cases relate to both the Professional Bureaucracy and Operating Adhocracy. In 
classifying the cases into one or the other types, the setting, type of work and dynamism 
have been taken into account. All cases deal with professional/expert work, ranging from 
the UK’s public health sector to change consultants. A detailed summary of the cases is 
provided in Annex 1. 
 
 
Case Study Analysis: Professional Bureaucracies 
 
Across the case studies we have looked for evidence of the types of motivators used and 
their relationship with HRM practices within the firms. Additionally we have looked for 
effects of crowding and synergy, social dilemmas and the tension between knowledge 
exploiting and knowledge augmenting modes. 
 
We find that whilst some firms place an emphasis on one motivational type, the 
interaction between motivators is telling, in some cases ‘crowding in’ and in others 
‘crowding out’. Within the professional bureaucracies studied we find two that use 
predominantly extrinsic motivation with an attendant tendency to diminish knowledge 
sharing.  
 
In Hall and Sapsed’s (2005) study of an aerospace simulator firm in financial difficulty 
(case 10) all activity is costed and knowledge sharing is seen as a billable activity. 
Within the firm, reward depends on the project’s outcome. Knowledge sharing in this 
case is reduced to a minimum as taking the time to ask for or share knowledge lessens 
the potential for reward, leading to opportunistic behaviour. Notably the feeling of the 
employees was stated as “we are very much structured around how much it costs for me 
to sit down with somebody for half an hour” (p.67). In this case, the social dilemma is 
reinforced, as the cost of contributing to the public good by sharing or seeking 
knowledge outweighs the potential benefit. In their study of a firm of consulting 
engineers (case 8) facing demographic challenge through the retirement of senior 
engineers the main route for career advancement was through the use of ‘embrained’ 
knowledge. Within the firm, there was little ethos of knowledge sharing and the 
perceived locus of knowledge ownership was at a personal rather than organisation level, 
even though individuals recognise that the organisation’s resources were used to 
augment their skills. The social dilemma is twofold as knowledge was not seen as a 
public good: first, sharing could be detrimental to career prospects - an extrinsic 
disincentive; second, with little normative motivation to share, even those about to retire 
and thus no longer competing at a career level, did not share. In these instances, extrinsic 
motivation crowds-out any inherent normative motivation for employees to share 
knowledge and the locus of ownership can be seen to be relevant in reinforcing 
knowledge hoarding. 
10 
  
Ferlie et al’s (2005) studies (case 7) of barriers to knowledge transfer and innovation in 
the UK public health sector, itself comprised of 8 case studies, highlights the tensions 
between different professional groups within a professional bureaucracy. The social 
dilemma in some of the cases related to the legitimacy of the public good. Sharing 
knowledge would lead to a change in the balance of roles and responsibilities between 
different professional groupings as a result of the innovations in healthcare practice. This 
raises a further issue, that of competing epistemic legitimacy between professional 
groups in complex settings, leading to a lack of sharing not only because there are doubts 
as to the validity of the knowledge claims but also, in extrinsic motivational terms, as the 
outcome may lead to a loss of autonomy and self-esteem within one of the professional 
groups. Thus within complex professional bureaucracies there may also be a case for 
studying knowledge sharing in the light of politics and power as adjuncts to normative 
and extrinsic motivation as highlighted in de Laat’s (1994) study of the effects of matrix 
management in R&D teams, and Swan and Scarbrough’s (2005) study of political effects 
in innovation networks. 
 
Within professional bureaucracies where knowledge is seen to be shared, the use of a 
combination of extrinsic motivators that align with the firm’s normative and the 
individuals’ inherent motivators seems to have more success. Career progression linked 
to appraisal systems which take into account knowledge sharing demonstrates 
recognition through competence and adherence to the organisation’s espoused 
knowledge sharing values. In Hall and Sapsed’s (2005) study of a large professional 
service firm (case 11) the quality of shared knowledge via contribution to a database 
forms part of the appraisal system, and provides a route for career progression, thus 
linking sharing to extrinsic motivation. This is coupled with socialisation opportunities 
to reinforce normative alignment. Self-selected training is available, which further 
increases the sense of autonomy in the choice of competence enhancing activities. This 
is echoed in Morris and Empson’s (1998) case relating to a professional service firm 
(case 6) in which knowledge sharing has become part of standard working practice and 
the rewards for sharing high quality knowledge lead to increased responsibility and 
further specialisation. This aligns with the individual’s inherent hedonic motivation: the 
extrinsic motivation provided by increased responsibility and further specialisation 
opportunities lead to possibilities of increased self-esteem and competence-enhancing 
activity. Normative motivation is further enhanced by regular socialisation opportunities. 
This has the effect of overcoming the social dilemma by providing a net benefit in 
sharing, coupled with the underlying need to share as part of the firm’s modus operandi. 
The situation is different for senior partners, where competition is fierce and recognition 
for innovation is realised through status by co-option to a “think-tank” of knowledge 
contributors. In order to maintain sharing behaviour, remaining as a contributor is 
concomitant on the continued sharing of knowledge. Here, the initial extrinsic 
motivation through recognition is reinforced by a desire to retain status: “It is a great 
honour to be asked to join this think tank. Joining the group has transformed the 
behaviour of some individuals who do not normally share their ideas” (Morris T and 
Empson, 1998: 617). 
 
On similar lines, Pan and Scarbrough’s (1998) study of Buckman Labs (case 5) 
illustrates that normative alignment through working practices in conjunction with 
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 recognition for outstanding contributions and the possibility of sanctions for not sharing 
are effective in overcoming the social dilemma. The strong knowledge sharing values at 
an organisational level are bolstered by the appraisal system that legitimises the extrinsic 
motivation used. The workplace environment, with a lowering of hierarchical boundaries 
in relation to knowledge sharing and job design that promotes knowledge sharing by 
routinising contributions to shared knowledge bases lead to a heightened sense of 
community and cooperation, enhancing the value of contributing to a public good. In this 
case, extrinsic motivators reinforce normative motivators by rewarding in a congruent 
fashion. 
 
The normative motivation used within professional bureaucracies builds on the 
underlying professional norms of their members in terms of quality of shared knowledge 
and propensity to share. This is reinforced by socialisation and opportunities to exchange 
knowledge at special events (Morris T and Empson, 1998, case 6) and through changing 
the normative frame of middle management from “gatekeepers” to “facilitators” (Pan 
and Scarbrough, 1998, case 5). 
 
Thus, within the professional bureaucracy, where extrinsic motivators that are congruent 
with organisational normative motivators and the individual’s motivational preferences, 
and the application of extrinsic motivators is part of the appraisal system, individuals are 
more likely to expend the effort to share knowledge for the common good rather than 
their own gain. This, of course, is underpinned by opportunities to share as well as a 
facilitating environment, implying that job design also plays a fundamental role. 
 
Case Study Analysis: Operating Adhocracies 
 
The cases pertaining to operating adhocracies display traits varying from the professional 
bureaucracies, in line with Mintzberg’s typology. First, there is a lower degree of 
formality and flatter structures, changing the underlying normative stance; second the 
work undertaken is more varied, resulting in unique solutions for clients and hence a 
tendency for higher knowledge augmenting activity. They all exhibit high levels of 
autonomy and recognition of expertise and achievement. 
 
There is a high congruence of the normative motivation of individuals and that of the 
organisations in the case studies, which has been achieved partly through recruitment 
practices. In Swart and Kinnie’s (2003) software development firm (case 4) employees 
are recruited not only for their expertise, but also because they “fit” with the firm, and 
the firm’s knowledge sharing ethos: “Technical ability was not considered the most 
important element and it was the company’s culture that led the recruitment process” 
(p.67). This ensured a high likelihood of normative alignment with both the firm and 
other employees, enhancing goal congruence. Within the software firm, HRM practices 
are defined with high participation of the employees and thus legitimated. The appraisal 
system involves peers and line managers, and knowledge sharing is recognised and 
rewarded through training opportunities, which are not necessarily work related, further 
enhancing hedonic motivation for employees’ interests outside the firm. Work design 
through job rotation, mentoring and responsibility for project leadership assigned by 
expertise fit rather than hierarchy reinforce normative motivation through socialisation, 
and hedonic motivation through enhanced self-esteem and autonomy. There is also a 
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 sense of challenge and enjoyment in the work: “you will never get bored” (p.68), again 
suggesting that work environment and hedonic motivation are significant and can 
outweigh financial incentives as the salary rates lie within the industry and location 
average in a geographical location with opportunities for work elsewhere. This suggests 
that knowledge is shared as it is seen as a public good and that it both gives opportunities 
for competence-enhancing rewards and can be competence-enhancing in its own right. 
 
Recruitment plays a similar key initial role in Robertson et al’s (2003) science based 
consultancy (case 2) and legal PSF (case 3). Both have stringent practices and recruit on 
“fit” with the firm as well as expertise, providing normative alignment and a sense of 
belonging to an “elite”. Knowledge sharing is a core value, and reciprocity is expected. 
Within the legal PSF, this extends to the use of the individual’s external networks. In 
both cases, the locus of ownership seems to remain with the individual, but the 
underlying alignment with the firm’s values and sense of identity with the firm overcome 
sharing issues. 
 
Within Morris and Empson’s (1998) small change management consultancy (case 1), 
employees are recruited for their expertise and swiftly inculcated with the firm’s way of 
working, leading to normative alignment. This acts not only at the level of sharing 
knowledge, which is perceived as a public good, but also at a deeper level: “If you ask 
people why they work here they will say, ‘because this company believes in the same 
kind of things that I believe in…’ (p.620). Knowledge sharing opportunities are provided 
both formally and informally, and job design promotes high autonomy. As with the 
software case, there is a sense that individuals’ hedonic motivation is catered for both by 
the work itself and by the environment provided. Sharing knowledge is one of the key 
values of the firm and its members which is reinforced by benefit at a collective level, 
underpinned by hedonic motivation. 
 
In the cases looked at, financially based extrinsic motivation does not appear to be a 
dominant factor influencing knowledge sharing behaviour. For example, in Robertson et 
al’s (2003) legal and science based PSFs (cases 2 and 3) salary levels are high, but staff 
are retained even when offered higher salaries outside. This is compensated for by the 
perception of working for an “elite” firm and extremely comfortable working conditions, 
reinforcing inherent hedonic motivation. In Morris and Emspon’s (1998) change 
consultancy (case 1) there is a profit sharing scheme based on salary, aligning gain at a 
firm level and reinforcing cooperation. Common to all the operating adhocracies is the 
use of professionally aligned training opportunities, funded by the firms, and in Swart 
and Kinnie’s (2003) case (case 4), of training opportunities not related to the firm but of 
interest to the individual, further reinforcing hedonic motivation. Appraisal is measured 
in terms of outcome and in some cases by contribution to the firm’s knowledge through 
sharing, reinforcing already high normative motivation for knowledge sharing, changing 
the focus of the individual from opportunistic to cooperative behaviour. Exceptionally, in 
Swart and Kinnie’s (2003) case, HRM practices including appraisal are formulated and 
endorsed by the employees, granting legitimacy to the processes and enhancing a 
cooperative frame. 
 
All of the operating adhocracies actively promote socialisation through informal 
meetings and formally through mentoring and job rotation as well as opportunities for 
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 knowledge sharing and provide the basis for these through work design and an enriching 
environment. Within the operating adhocracy cases, the extrinsic motivators are 
congruent with the firm’s and individuals’ goals and are concordant with the firm’s 
underlying ethos of knowledge sharing norms and seek to align with the normative 
values of the individuals. At a hedonic level, the opportunities for competence building 
through the tasks themselves and further training, coupled with an enriching and 
enjoyable environment and job design, suggests that alignment of all three motivators 
leads to effective knowledge sharing. The emphasis on enjoyment of work echoes 
Amabile’s (1997) suggestion that it plays an important role in creative knowledge 
augmenting activities. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has sought to develop a motivation-based perspective to understand the 
complex dynamics of knowledge sharing in different organisational contexts. It draws on 
the theoretical insights of the knowledge-based view of the firm and the transaction cost 
perspective both of which emphasise the centrality of one particular motivational 
mechanism in governing the behaviour of organisational members. While the former 
stresses the crucial role of normative intrinsic motivation, the latter gives a pivotal role to 
extrinsic incentives. In this paper, we propose to bridge the dichotomous view of these 
two different perspectives by focussing on the motivational processes and the interactive 
relationships between different motivators. The analysis builds on a three-category 
taxonomy of motivation, adding a third dimension, ‘hedonic motivation’, a concept 
proposed by Lindenberg (2001), to the traditional dichotomy of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation. The core assumption is that the willingness of organisational members to 
share knowledge can be viewed on a continuum from purely opportunistic behaviour 
regulated by management authority to an altruistic stance fostered by social norms and 
group identity. We argue that the interaction and mix of the three different motivators 
play a key role in regulating and translating potential into actual behaviour, and they 
underline the complex dynamics of knowledge sharing and creation in different 
organisational contexts. 
 
The empirical analysis presented in the paper draws on existing case studies gleaned 
from the literature. Although the cases were not designed specifically to examine 
motivational issues, we have been able to reframe them to explore the interactive effects 
of different motivational mechanisms and the ways in which they influence the patterns 
of knowledge sharing in the two different types of knowledge-intensive organisations. 
The analysis suggests that within the professional bureaucracy, the social dilemma for 
knowledge sharing may be overcome through normative motivation, with provision of 
hedonic motivation through extrinsic incentives such as training and career progression. 
The UK public healthcare sector case (Ferlie et al, 2005), however, demonstrates the 
inherent dilemma of knowledge sharing in a professional bureaucracy: strong normative 
motivation for knowledge sharing within uni-professional communities inhibits the 
transfer of knowledge across communities. Further, extrinsic incentives may ‘crowd out’ 
intrinsic motivation for knowledge sharing because of perceived diminished autonomy 
and responsibility within professional groups. In an operating adhocracy where 
interdependent team work is vital, the social dilemma may be overcome through 
normative alignment reinforced by intensive socialisation opportunities to foster goal 
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 congruence. Extrinsic motivators that align with the individual’s hedonic motivation may 
serve to strengthen the propensity for knowledge sharing. In line with Amabile’s (1997) 
argument, our analysis shows the critical role of hedonic motivation in stimulating 
creative and knowledge augmenting activities in an operating adhocracy. In both 
organisational types, normative and hedonic motivators play a significant role in 
stimulating knowledge sharing. Financial extrinsic incentives do not appear to be 
relevant on their own, but they play a significant role in either ‘crowding out’ or 
‘crowding in’ other motivators. 
 
The complex dynamics of interactive relationships among the three motivators, namely, 
extrinsic, normative and hedonic, suggest that the nature of their relationships may not 
be reducible to a clear ‘yes’ (crowding in) or ‘no’ (crowding out) effect. An important 
insight gained from the analysis is that there is a continuum of relationship between 
them. Two fundamental questions remain to be explored. First, in what ways the process 
of internalisation and socialisation may make extrinsically motivated behaviour 
autonomous and turn it into a ‘hedonic’ form of motivation? And second, to what extent 
normative motivation serves as an intermediating variable regulating the relationship 
between externally regulated incentives/motivators and internally generated hedonic 
motivation which appears to be a most critical factor in stimulating creative and 
innovative behaviour? For future analysis, we propose to integrate further the work of 
social psychologists with that of socio-economists on incentives and motivation to 
advance our understanding of knowledge sharing and creation in different organisational 
contexts. 
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Annex 1 -  A Summary of the Empirical Cases 
Motivators Case / 
Reference 
Context Type 
Context Extrinsic Normative Hedonic 
HRM Practices Crowding / Alignment 
1 
Morris and 
Emspon, 1988 
Small change 
management 
consultancy 
Operating 
Adhocracy, 
Knowledge 
Augmenting 
High alignment 
with firm’s 
knowledge 
sharing values; 
identification 
with firm 
Profit share 
based on salary; 
pleasant 
environment 
Reliance on 
professionalism 
of staff 
Sense of 
enjoyment 
working for 
company 
High autonomy 
through design and 
type of work 
Work and conditions align with 
self-determination and esteem to 
promote knowledge sharing; 
organisation focus through profit 
sharing and high inherent 
normative values reduce 
opportunistic behaviour 
2 
Robertson et al, 
2003 
Science based 
consultancy 
Operating 
Adhocracy, 
Knowledge 
Augmenting 
High 
identification 
with firm; 
knowledge 
sharing values 
are part of 
recruitment 
Professional 
training; reward 
linked to 
outcomes 
through patents 
High knowledge 
sharing values; 
professional 
norms; social 
identity through 
professional 
alignment is high; 
extensive 
socialisation 
Sense of 
wellbeing with 
company; 
challenging work
Recruitment on fit 
and expertise; 
Professional training 
funded; Appraisal 
linked to knowledge 
sharing outcomes 
High levels of normative 
motivation are reinforced by 
extrinsic and hedonic motivation. 
Recruitment underpins knowledge 
sharing values which align with 
the firm’s and individual’s 
normative values. Environment 
and work design reinforce 
hedonic motivation. 
3 
Robertson et al, 
2003 
Legal PSF Operating 
Adhocracy, 
Knowledge 
Augmenting 
High 
identification 
with firm; 
sharing of 
external 
professional 
networks; 
recruitment for 
“fit” and sense of 
being part of an 
“elite”. 
Recognition 
through 
competence and 
professional 
status afforded 
by firm; creative, 
challenging 
opportunities; 
high autonomy. 
Extensive 
socialisation 
opportunities, 
combined with 
firm’s values of 
knowledge 
sharing and 
professional 
excellence. 
Identification 
with prestigious 
firm; excellent 
working 
conditions; 
assignments are 
an opportunity to 
learn. Work 
design enhances 
hedonic 
motivation. 
Recruitment based 
on expertise and 
alignment with 
firm’s professional 
and knowledge 
sharing values; new 
members are 
intensively exposed 
to firm’s working 
practices and values 
Recruitment for expertise and fit 
provide a baseline high level of 
normative congruence with the 
firm’s values: there is an 
expectancy of sharing and 
reciprocity. Combination of 
normative and hedonic motivators 
with opportunity for autonomous, 
competence enhancing 
assignments, and limited but 
sufficient extrinsic motivators: 
staff remain with firm even when 
offered higher salaries elsewhere. 
 Motivators 
4 
Swart and 
Kinnie, 2003 
Software 
development 
Operating 
Adhocracy, 
Knowledge 
Augmenting 
Flat hierarchy 
with average 
salary levels. 
Unique projects 
building on prior 
experience and 
new knowledge. 
High alignment 
with firm’s 
values. 
Responsibility 
based on 
competence for a 
given project. 
Training in work 
and non-work 
related areas. 
Mentoring / 
apprenticeship 
model and job 
rotation lead to 
socialisation and 
competence 
enhancement. 
Possibility of 
non-work related 
training. 
Opportunities to 
work on “cutting-
edge” projects. 
Recruitment for fit 
with firm. Practices 
legitimated by 
employee committee 
structure; Appraisal 
by peers, team 
members and 
management. 
Rewards linked to 
knowledge sharing.  
Recruitment policy ensures 
competence and normative 
alignment, reinforced by training 
opportunities, both external and 
from peers, building on 
competences and reinforcing 
interdependence. Extrinsic 
motivators reinforce normative 
and hedonic motivators. Job 
design and working environment 
are supportive of a knowledge 
sharing culture which is expected, 
recognised and rewarded 
5 
Pan and 
Scarbrough, 
1998 
Multinational 
Specialty 
Chemicals 
Professional 
Bureaucracy, 
Knowledge 
Exploiting 
Firm espouses a 
“knowledge-
enterprising 
culture” (p61). 
Emphasis on 
change towards 
sharing through 
middle 
management 
becoming 
facilitators rather 
than gatekeepers. 
Exceptional 
performance 
recognised and 
rewarded. 
Sanctions for not 
sharing. Self 
selected 
professional 
training 
opportunities. 
Firm-wide values 
of knowledge 
sharing. 
Hierarchical 
boundaries are 
softened vis-à-vis 
knowledge 
seeking and 
sharing. 
Ease of use and 
availability of 
ICT does not 
raise additional 
barriers to 
knowledge 
sharing.  
Exceptional 
performance is 
recognised through 
special events. 
Knowledge sharing 
is part of appraisal, 
is recognised and 
rewarded. Active 
approach to 
inculcating 
knowledge sharing 
values of firm. 
Extrinsic motivators used 
reinforce normative and hedonic: 
training allows enhanced self-
competence; recognition for 
exceptional performance enhances 
self-esteem. The potential of 
sanctions for not sharing appears 
to be effective. Hierarchical 
flattening in respect of knowledge 
sharing and seeking emphasises 
common values and increases 
self-esteem. Socialisation through 
mentoring reinforces normative 
motivation and provides common 
contexts. 
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 Motivators 
6 
Morris and 
Emspon, 1988 
Tax and audit 
branch of large 
PSF 
Professional 
Bureaucracy, 
Knowledge 
Exploiting & 
Augmenting 
Highly 
autonomous 
within the PSF’s 
framework of 
working 
practices. Junior 
staff engaged in 
knowledge 
exploiting; senior 
staff in 
knowledge 
augmenting 
activities. 
Opportunities to 
specialise. 
Extensive 
training. 
Recognition of 
competence. 
Status 
maintained 
through 
continued 
sharing of high 
quality 
knowledge. 
Knowledge 
sharing part of 
“normal” 
working 
practices. Regular 
conferences allow 
knowledge 
sharing and 
socialisation. 
Increase in 
professional 
knowledge 
through 
assignments. 
Greater 
responsibilities 
linked to 
performance, itself 
measured partially 
through knowledge 
sharing. Knowledge 
sharing is inherent 
in job design. 
Training 
demonstrates 
investment by firm 
in staff and 
enhances 
competences. 
Appraisal process links sharing 
knowledge with further 
opportunities enhancing self-
determination and self-esteem. 
Extrinsic motivators are congruent 
with normative and hedonic 
motivation. At a junior level, 
work design reinforces normative 
motivation; at a senior level, 
recognition for creativity and 
sharing has led to a change in 
behaviour towards knowledge 
sharing (p617). 
7 
Ferlie et al 
2005 
UK public 
health sector, 8 
studies of 
innovation 
transfer 
Professional 
Bureaucracy, 
Knowledge 
Exploiting 
Studies the 
spread of 
innovations 
across settings 
involving 
different 
professional 
groupings, and 
potential change 
in responsibilities 
and working 
practices. 
Recognition for 
innovation 
transfer and 
adoption. 
Changes in level 
of responsibility 
and working 
practices 
resulting from 
adoption. 
Professional level 
for knowledge 
sharing. 
  In the unsuccessful cases, 
different epistemic and embedded 
cultures and inter-professional 
boundaries coupled with a 
likelihood of change in working 
practices and responsibilities, lead 
to a loss of self-esteem and self-
determination as the outcome of 
sharing knowledge, crowding out 
inherent normative motivation. In 
the successful case, high 
socialisation and normative and 
goal congruence was present, in 
addition to recognition, enhancing 
knowledge sharing. 
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 Motivators 
8 
Hall and 
Sapsed, 2005 
Consulting 
Engineers 
Professional 
Bureaucracy, 
Knowledge 
Exploiting 
Predominant 
behaviour is 
knowledge 
hoarding, with 
the locus of 
knowledge 
ownership at a 
personal rather 
than 
organisational 
level. 
Career 
progression 
through 
professional 
expertise 
Firm is 
attempting to 
promote 
organisation wide 
sharing ethos. 
 Career path is 
related to experience 
and professional 
expertise. 
Knowledge is shared within the 
limits of necessity, with extrinsic 
motivation crowding out attempts 
to introduce a knowledge sharing 
culture. The perception that 
knowledge owned personally, 
even if gained through the firm’s 
resources augments knowledge 
hoarding, by behaving 
opportunistically. 
9 
Hall and 
Sapsed, 2005 
Oil and gas 
services firm 
Operating 
Adhocracy, 
Knowledge 
Exploiting & 
Augmenting 
Knowledge 
augmenting 
within the 
operating core. 
Firm’s goal is to 
accumulate 
expertise within 
its staff. 
Bonuses for 
contributing to 
codified 
knowledge-base 
built into project 
budget 
Firm emphasises 
interdependence 
on expertise. 
Training in 
professional 
specialisation; 
varied, 
challenging 
work. 
Professional 
training, mentoring 
and job rotation. 
Appraisal system 
rewards 
contributions to 
codified knowledge. 
High levels of socialisation and 
competence enhancement through 
exposure to different settings is 
the main vehicle for tacit 
knowledge sharing, which is not 
crowded out – the extrinsic 
motivation relating to competence 
enhancement aligns with the 
individuals’ own norms allowing 
increased self-esteem 
(competence enhancement and 
advancement within professional 
bodies). Knowledge sharing 
achieved through inherent 
normative motivation in addition 
to hedonic motivation of job 
design and training 
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 Motivators 
10 
Hall and 
Sapsed, 2005 
Aerospace 
Simulator 
developers 
Professional 
Bureaucracy, 
Knowledge 
Exploiting 
All employees’ 
time is costed. 
There is a 
“lessons learned” 
database, but 
contribution does 
not form part of 
the appraisal 
process. 
Reward linked to 
project outcome 
and targets. 
Inherent 
normative 
motivators 
 Appraisal and 
reward linked to 
meeting project 
targets. 
Extrinsic motivation linked solely 
to target meeting, and knowledge 
sharing opportunities are limited 
by the “billable” aspect of person-
to-person sharing which combine 
as time taken to seek or share k is 
deductible from the project’s 
budget, thus lessening the 
potential target meeting ability. In 
this case, extrinsic motivation 
crowds out inherent normative 
motivation resulting in knowledge 
hoarding. 
11 
Hall and 
Sapsed, 2005 
Management 
consultancy – 
large PSF 
Professional 
Bureaucracy, 
Knowledge 
Exploiting 
Need to retain 
knowledge for re-
use between 
projects, 
achieved through 
databases, which 
is part of job 
design. Firm 
faces high staff 
turnover. 
Career 
advancement 
through high 
quality 
contributions. 
Knowledge 
sharing ethos 
underpinned by 
work practices 
 Appraisal process 
linked to 
contributions 
Extrinsic motivation for high 
quality knowledge, coupled with 
the firm’s knowledge sharing 
values, supported by working 
practices lead to knowledge 
sharing. This does not address the 
issue of staff retention, implying 
that there are other motivators 
which are not addressed. 
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